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eMudhra weak keys incident
Eight intermediate CA private keys generated as small numbers (4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237) instead of random 384-bit values, allowing certificate forgery for 18 months
Eight intermediate CA private keys generated as small numbers (4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237) instead of random 384-bit values, allowing certificate forgery for 18 months.
Drawn from 1 news source; the facts and relationships below show where each detail comes from.
Facts 4
| Attribute | Value | Confidence | Sources | Cited |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Date | 2025-04-30 | low | 1 | 1 |
| Victim | Organizations using eMudhra-issued TLS and code-signing certificates | low | 1 | 1 |
| Impact | Attackers could forge TLS and code-signing certificates within seconds using publicly available keys | low | 1 | 1 |
| Records affected | 30000 | low | 1 | 1 |